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This paper describes an ongoing exploration examining the way different
aspects of our cognition and physical interactions with the world work
together. This will draw on material from several disciplines and will include
some well established and some more speculative results. In the talk I'll also
discuss how this understanding can influence design both because we can
understand users better, but also because we can understand designers!
Keywords:  interface design, evolutionary psychology, imagination, creativity,
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An exploration
This paper is not presenting a finished piece of work or even a definitive
review of an area.  Instead I am going to describe an exploration, a journey
through a partially formed, partially understood intellectual territory.  And,
although distorted by the pressures of performance indicators, funding
deadlines and publication targets, surely exploration is what academia is about?
We are going to look at two sides to human nature.  On the one hand are the
deep, usually unconscious and sometimes automatic responses and on the
other are the conscious and complex ways in which we reason and imagine.
The deeper parts of our nature are often aspects that we share with animals and
are either with us since birth or come, as a form of birthright, through being
human in a human society and a physical world.  In this I include not just very
low level reactions to pain, and Skinner-style behavioural conditioning, but
also those aspects of our cognitive nature that work without conscious
attention and effort including basic number sense, and physical and social
models of the world.
I’ve been struggling with a word to refer collectively to these deep responses
and cognition as the words used in psychology tend to have very specific
meanings.  I often find myself using the term ‘innate’ although these things are
clearly not all ’from birth’.  I know this word is a term of debate in cognitive
science so I apologise, but other words such as ‘unconscious’ or ‘subliminal’
(used in media studies for this) are equally problematic.
This distinction is important, not because it corresponds to a particular
separation within the mind, but because it has practical implications for
interfaces and design in general.
The deep ‘innate’ unconscious understanding we have of the world is only
really good at dealing with the mundane, ordinary things of life, and is slow to
adapt.  Yet it requires little attention and mental effort (often indeed acting at a
motor level) and is fast.  In contrast our rich conscious thinking is highly
effective for complex situations and can adapt to novel and changing
circumstances.  However, it needs attention and is comparatively slow.
If we can design devices well for the former we can harness its speed and low
demands for low-level interaction and thus free our higher abilities for the real
tasks we want to do.
Actually this is true at two levels.  I have what I call the ‘Golden Rule of
Design’:
understand your materials
For human–computer interaction this includes understanding humans and
how their minds work.  However, as designers and as academics we ourselves
are also part of our own materials that we use during our creative work.  By
understanding better the way our minds work we are better able to utilise
ourselves.
This issue of creativity is quite central.  When referring to the higher more
complex levels of thinking, I do not just refer to the classical Aristotelian
logical thinking, but also the way in which imagination works with this and
our deeper understandings.
From birth and before
The tiniest baby will curl its toes when its foot is stroked, will cry if stabbed with
a needle to draw blood, or startle at a loud noise.  These are clearly reactions
hard wired into our nervous systems in the womb.  However, there are also
surprisingly complex cognitive processes that are present from birth or a very
early age before they can have been learnt from the environment.
From the moment a child opens its eyes it is able to apprehend numbers up to
three (Antell and Keating, 1983).  This is detected using gaze length.  On
average a baby gazes longer at novel stimuli.  If shown many different images
all with two items the baby’s gaze length will diminish gradually, but if an
image with three items is introduced into the sequence, gaze length will
increase.  This is not just the complexity of the image gaining more attention; if
images with three dots continue to be displayed the gaze again decays, but
lengthens again if an image with two dots is shown.  The baby has a sense of
numerosity even at birth – really innate.
In fact other animals have this ability and in “The Number Sense” Dehaene
suggests that there is a very old brain mechanism for recognising continuous
number quantity with an error of around 20% (Dehaene, 1997).  So, at a glance,
we can tell the difference between 60 and 100, but not between 90 and 100 unless
there is some special pattern.  The difference between 2 and 3 is bigger than this
20% error hence the numbers 1, 2, 3 are all distinguishable uniquely.
As the baby grows to 5 months or so, similar experiments show that babies can
effectively ‘add’ small numbers: if you put two things one by one behind a
screen they ‘know’ that there should be 2 items there when the screen is
removed (Wynne, 1992).
These abilities are distinct from ‘counting’ which is essentially a verbal related
ability and comes much later.
As we grow we begin to become aware of our bodies, interact with our parents
and family, and explore the world.  This leads us into a range of abilities and
understandings of the world.  For example, when pressing a light switch or
clicking a hypertext link, if there is no immediate reaction, the ‘instinctive’
response is to press again.  Of course real physical things such as stones work
exactly like that.  If you push and it doesn’t move you simply press harder.
Whether this is really an instinctive reaction, or merely one that has been
learnt from an early age, it has certainly become part of our unconscious model
of the physical world.
Where designs for systems work with this they work well.  However, many
computer and electronic systems do not work with these natural reactions.
You press the ‘open/close door’ button, there is some delay in response and the
door does not open, you press again, the system interprets your second press as
a ‘close’ and hence the door starts to open and then instantly closes again.
Working with Masitah Ghazali at Lancaster, we have been looking at ordinary
consumer devices and using them to uncover the ways in which their
designers have (or have not) made use of natural properties of physicality
(Ghazali and Dix, 2003).  For example, some switches in and of themselves
show that they have two states, on and off, whereas others require separate
indicators.  The former in some way embody natural properties of physicality.
Similarly if we move a real thing by accident we simply move it back.  Some
devices make physically opposite actions have logically opposite effects.  By
studying these devices we aim to ‘mine’ the rich knowledge embodied within
them, and hence build a design vocabulary and understanding that can be used
for novel tangible devices.
In related work I have been looking at the way we have learnt to ‘grow’ our
idea of ‘self’ to include artefacts around us (Dix, 2002).  This is crucial for our
understanding of cyborg technology and wearable computing.  In everyday acts
from driving a car to eating with knife and fork we are able to operate as if
these things were in some way extensions to our bodies.  In trying to
understand this we can look back to tool use, both of early hominids and of
other animals such as chimpanzees who use termite sticks to eat insects, and
birds that crack snail shells with stones.  In these cases too the animal needs, in
some way, to operate as if the object were part of itself.  Furthermore, using a
stick means that the locus of action (the end of the stick in the hole) is distant
from the locus of control (where the chimp holds the stick) – mediated hand-
eye coordination not so far distant from moving a mouse cursor on the screen.
The many minds of the caveman
This reasoning forward from the behaviour of our ancestors to understand the
modern mind, is something I recall doing as a school child.  However, it was
less than 10 years ago when I first used it ‘in anger’ in interaction problems, in
particular to help understand why we appear not to be able to cope with
rhythms slower than around a beat per second and are even less able to
proceduralise any sort of delay (Dix, 1996).
The traditional maxim denoting a simple thing is to say “A child should be able
to use it”.  For computer systems this was obviously silly ... it is the adults who
have problems!  Instead I coined my own maxim:
a caveman should be able to use it
By this I do not mean that a computer system should be usable by a re-animated
Neolithic ice man, but instead that our brains and bodies are not substantially
different from when we were hunter gatherers; there has simply not been
sufficient time for natural selection to change us.  So, if an interface requires
any fundamental cognitive or physical abilities that a caveman would not need
it is likely that we do not have them either.  We are flexible and clever as users
of course, so may well adapt, but it is likely to be hard to learn and potentially
always require more mental effort and attention.
It was only around this time I found that there was a developing field of
evolutionary psychology, notably Leda Cosmides and John Tooby at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, looking at precisely this sort of
reasoning (Tooby and Cosmides, 1997).  Whilst this work has its critics there are
few who would argue with the basic premise – we are all cavemen under our
skulls!
Figure 1.    is our mind like this?
One of the more controversial aspects of their work is the so called “Swiss
Army Knife” model of the mind.  Rather than seeing our reasoning as a
generic tool influenced by experience and past inferences, they see it more as a
collection of special purpose intelligences and reasoning units, each specialised
for a particular domain: social, physical, animal, etc.   An example of the latter
is Cosmides experiments using variants of the Wason card test (Cosmides,
1989).  If the task is posed as one of social contract and possible deceit the
majority of people get the test ‘right’, whilst alternative ways to pose the
question, even very concrete ones, all lead to ‘illogical’ answers.
Of course this ‘many intelligences’ is not controversial itself; most accept that
we have some special purpose reasoning abilities.  The differences are more
about the details of these, the balance between general purpose intelligence and
specialised intelligence and the level to which these are genetic or developed.
From a design viewpoint, these special intelligences tend to be exactly the sort
of deep, unconscious understanding that it is good to recruit in interfaces.
Mithin in his book “The Prehistory of the Mind” focuses on the way in which
we link together these special purpose intelligences (Mithin, 1996).  He looks to
palaeontological evidence in order to try to discover when different kinds of
intelligence became ‘joined up’.  We seem to share many of these specialised
intelligences with even primitive creatures, but for them they stay separate.  He
traces the way they start to join, leading to the point at about 40-60,000 years ago,
when they eventually come together.
This socio-linguistic Eden (my term!) has been recognised as archaeologically
significant for many reasons including the start of primitive art, changes in
social patterns and the production of multi-part tools.  Strangely there are no
physiological changes at this time.  The last significant changes in brain shape
(as measured by skull shape) took place around 120,000 years ago.  The spark at
the Eden point seems to be more about language and social organisation than
physical development, although clearly the cognitive and neurological
foundations for this were laid some 80,000 years earlier.
Connections
Mithin’s work gives a clear story as to when our special purpose intelligences
become ‘joined up’.  I have become particularly interested in how they connect.
The most obvious way is through logical or formal reasoning.  The knowledge
from different sources is effectively encoded verbally or symbolically.  The
symbols are manipulated solely as symbols and because of their distancing from
their real meanings are able to be processed uniformly.  Whilst there has been a
traditional fear in philosophy of the separation of words from deeper meanings
(Tofts and McKeich, 1997), it is precisely this which makes them a tool for
linking disparate understandings.
Figure 2.    logic as the focus
However, there is also a form of linking that even the most primitive creatures
possess.  Because we live and act in the world our actions cause consequences
that feed back through our perceptions.  If my social sense tells me to go and
talk to someone, the presence of a door in the way alerts my understanding of
the physical world to open the door.  The world ‘kicks back’, meaning that the
actions of one type of intelligence create external causes for others.
Figure 3.    the world kicks back
Finally for now, although this is not the end of the story, our imaginations are
very vivid.  If a subject is brain scanned whilst looking at a picture various
parts of the brain ‘light up’.  If the same person is asked to imagine the picture
then many of the same areas light up including parts associated with
perception right back to the visual cortex.  It is really as if we perceive what we
imagine.  Because of this, our imaginings are ‘available’ to other parts of our
minds just as real perceptions are.  So when our social mind says “go talk to
that person”, we begin to imagine our getting up and going and this gets filled
in by our spatial knowledge which mentally ‘kicks back’, when we imagine












Figure 4.    imagination kicks back
Of course, this is just the beginning.  Our imagination and logic are not so
disparate as they may seem.  In fact, they do link together, notably through story
and narrative; however, that is certainly another story!  For more on this see
my essays on imagination and rationality and related topics (Dix, 2003).
At a practical level we can harness these things.
This is one of the reasons that personae and scenarios are so useful in design.
While we are talking about a user group, say warehouse managers, it is hard to
know how they will behave, how they will react to particular designs.
However, when we have a rich scenario like in figure 5, suddenly we are far
more able to look at a design and say “Betty would do this there”.  Our social
understanding of others does not formalise well and so is hard to recruit
logically when dealing with an abstract group.  However, when faced with real
situations and real people we are quite successful at predicting their actions and
reactions.  The scenario recruits the same understanding by summoning our
imagination.
Betty is 37 years old,  She has been Warehouse Manager for five years
and worked for Simpkins Brothers Engineering for twelve years.  She
didn’t go to university, but has studied in her evenings for a business
diploma.  She has two children aged 15 and 7 and does not like to work
late.  She did part of an introductory in-house computer course some
years ago, but it was interrupted when she was promoted and could no
longer afford to take the time.  Her vision is perfect, but her right-hand
movement is slightly restricted following an industrial accident 3 years
ago.  She is enthusiastic about her work and is happy to delegate
responsibility and take suggestions from her staff.  However, she does
feel threatened by the introduction of yet another new computer system
(the third in her time at SBE).
Figure 5.    example scenario (from Dix et al., 2004)
The interplay between rationality and imagination is also something I use
extensively in thinking about practical creativity and in the formulation of
strategies and cognitive scaffolding for technical innovation (Dix, 1999).  An
example of this is the way in which we addressed the design of virtual
Christmas crackers, taking a very physical and visceral experience and
translating it onto the web (Dix, 2003b).  The deconstruction–reconstruction
process involves both rich imaginative understanding of the existing
experience and also a reductionist dissection of the experience.  Together these
led to an innovative design that has elicited deep responses from those who
remember childhood Christmases as well as fun for all!
Learning through play
Imagine a microbe 2 billion years ago.  It has only one way to learn, through the
patient and slow mutation of genes, through the death of those that take
‘wrong’ paths and life of those that succeed.  Through countless generations
they learn to adapt to their environment, passing on good traits to their
offspring.
Now imagine a more complex creature, perhaps a small bird.  Genetic
evolution has endowed this creature with the ability to learn itself.  It can adapt
to certain changes in its environment: for example, some birds have learnt to
place nuts on railway tracks so that they are crushed by the wheels and easier to
eat.  However, this knowledge is held only in the bird’s own brain and is lost
when it dies.
In fact, the bird’s trick may well be picked up by others, because in packs, flocks
and herds and also in family units we have also the ability to imitate.
Imitation plus lifetime memory enables social animals to pass on knowledge.
However, this can only happen when there is some level of shared experience.
Without co-experience there can be no imitation and so no learning.
Play partially breaks this link, allowing young animals to engage in experiences
that are not real.  Through vicarious experience they learn about things they
have never directly experienced.  Of course this play is rooted in a degree of
imagination, albeit primitive.
Finally it is through language that we are able to codify that vicarious
experience into words that have life outside the individual.
In summary, we have a progression:
• evolution – learning across generations, very slow changes
• lifetime learning – learning within one individual, fast changes
• herd imitation – learning across generations, needs co-experience
• play – learning across generations, through vicarious experience and
imagination
• language – learning across generations, through imagination and symbols
Note the way that play prefigures language and develops exactly the
imaginative (re)creation of experience that will later be needed for narrative
and story telling.  Indeed in a recent book it is argued that one of the key things
that makes us human is exactly that we never fully mature! (Bromhall, 2003)
Figure 6.    ludic design Gaver’s drift table (Gaver, et al., 2003)
Again, we can make use of the power of playful imaginings in design.  Bill
Gaver has been a strong advocate of ‘ludic’ design, design for the playfulness of
people’s lives (Gaver, et al., 2003).  Also play can be used as a design heuristic.  I
advocate the use of ‘bad ideas’ in design, to prompt radical steps in the design




In Lancaster Computing Department, we have a
performance arts group called .:thePooch:. who create
various installations often in ‘playful arenas’ such as
clubs and arts events (www.thepooch.com).  As well as
being  successful as art, these exhibits often create
opportunities to see radically different kinds of
interaction.  For example, the Schizophrenic Cyborg
consists of two performers.  One wears a screen
strapped to his stomach whilst the other at some
distance has a laptop which wirelessly sends text to the
screen.  Those who interact with the cyborg have to
cope with effectively two individuals in the ‘same
space’.  Even if told that the screen is controlled
elsewhere they find it hard to dissociate the two and
the cyborg himself feels dislocated (Sheridan et al.,
2004).
Although this is an extreme example, we are all of us
finding ourselves in multi-party multi-way
interactions through phone, chat programs, and face to
face conversations.  As wearable technology becomes
common it may not be easy to tell if a person is
looking into your eyes or at the text scrolling projected
onto her retina (Sheridan et al., 2000).  The playfulness of the arts world allows
us to experiment with aspects of interaction that would be hard to create now
in ‘serious’ settings, yet are clearly going to become important in the future.
Beginnings
At this point it is customary to have a conclusion, but as this is an exploration
and a journey, conclusions sound too tidied up, too final.
I hope I have given some inkling of the fascinating interplay between
rationality, physicality and imagination.  I also believe that some of the
practical outcomes of this are evident both in terms of understanding the users
of our designs and also understanding how we can better operate as designers
and academics.
However, these are merely beginnings and I am very aware that this sort of
work treads, sometimes roughshod, over many disciplines.  I am therefore
eager to receive feedback and hear of related work.
I will post further links and information at:
http://www.hcibook.com/alan/papers/i2004-imagination/
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